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Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What’s
Love Got to Do with It?

Gregory D. Hess
Claremont McKenna College and Center for Economic Studies—IFO

When markets are incomplete, individuals may choose to marry to
diversify their labor income risk. Love, however, can complicate the
picture. If love is ﬂeeting or the resolution of agents’ income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life, then marriages with good
economic matches last longer. In contrast, if love is persistent and the
resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income occurs early, then marriages with good economic matches are more likely to be caught short
with too little love to save a marriage. Consequently, once married,
the partners will be more likely to divorce. Evidence is provided to
distinguish between these alternative scenarios.

I.

Introduction

In his seminal work on the economics of marriage, Becker (1974) argued
that the fundamental reason for marriage is the creation of one’s own
children, since “sexual gratiﬁcation, cleaning, feeding and other services
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can be purchased” (p. 304), but one’s own children cannot be. He also
emphasized the role the marriage market plays in sorting individuals
on the basis of their traits: positive assortative mating would rely on
these traits to be complements, whereas negative assortative mating
would require these traits to be substitutes.
In contrast, several economists have also considered the pure risksharing elements of marriage.1 Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) analyze the
gains from marriage from risk sharing when expected lifetimes are uncertain. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) explore the marriage market from
the perspective of how families in different Indian villages arranged
marriages in order to offset weather-related risk. Recently, Ogaki and
Zhang (2001) ﬁnd further evidence that women migrate to distant villages to marry as a means of family risk sharing.2
The broader risk-sharing literature, however, contains strong evidence
against complete risk sharing and complete markets. At the macro level,
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) demonstrate incomplete crosscountry risk sharing; among others, at the micro level, Cochrane (1991),
Mace (1991), and Hess and Shin (2000) provide evidence against complete aggregate risk sharing across households within a country, whereas
Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) demonstrate incomplete risk sharing across generations even within a family.
This paper analyzes the role that economic factors such as risk sharing
play in the decision to get married and stay married, and how the
presence of love interacts with these economic motives. In this model,
individuals are faced with randomly ﬂuctuating labor incomes, which
they can smooth intertemporally by borrowing or saving at a risk-free
rate, exactly as in the permanent income hypothesis. However, there is
assumed to be no formal market to diversify idiosyncratic risk to income.3
Marriage, whereby two individuals consume out of common resources,
does provide an opportunity to partially offset the idiosyncratic shocks
to their income.
While the desire to offset idiosyncratic labor risk could be a powerful
inducement to marry, it is also the case that other issues also matter
when it comes to marrying and staying married. I simply term this factor
“love.” In the model, love is an additively separable, exogenous nonpecuniary endowment good, which two individuals mutually share. It
is, for better or for worse, subject to shared ﬂuctuations. As will be
1
Indeed, some would argue that in societies in which the means of intertemporal
consumption smoothing are limited, children themselves would provide a type of income
insurance for old age or disability. This paper does not consider the use of children for
this role.
2
See Bergstrom (1996) and Weiss (1997) for a broader survey of the literature on the
economics of the family.
3
Moral hazard is a good reason for why labor income risk is not fully insurable (see
Chami and Fischer 1996).
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shown, how long initial love can be expected to last and when the
resolution of agents’ income takes place crucially affect the way in which
observed economic characteristics can be used to predict whether a
marriage will succeed or end in divorce.
A number of strong predictions about the relationship between mates
who are good economic matches (e.g., those that provide consumption
insurance for one another) and their ability to get married, as well as
stay married, are implied by the model. First, if love is a short-lived
phenomenon or the resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income occurs
primarily in the future, then married couples who are better economic
matches actually stay married longer. This holds because, for this case,
the costs of being married to a poor match (e.g., a poor hedge) rise
too steeply in the future. Alternatively, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty about shocks to income occurs primarily early in
life, married couples who are better economic matches for one another
are more likely to divorce, not less. The reason lies in the substitution
between consumption insurance and love at the time of the decision
to marry. Operationally, while both good economic match characteristics
and love will cause a couple to marry, if love is long-lasting and future
income uncertainty is low, initial love becomes more important to keep
them together in the long run. The results below, however, clearly indicate that there is strong evidence for the former scenario: namely,
that marriages between partners who are good economic matches for
one another lead to marriages of longer expected duration. A direct
implication is that a good deal of initial love is not a sufﬁcient substitute
for marrying a good economic match in order for a marriage to be
expected to last longer.
The paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in Section
II, and ﬁve propositions are derived that link marital income characteristics to the decision to get married and stay married. Section III
provides a test of the propositions relating the effect of marital income
characteristics on marital duration. I present conclusions in Section IV.
II.

The Model

The model has three time periods: 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, two individuals, i and j, randomly meet and decide whether or not to get married.
They learn the expected correlation of their incomes, rij, and observe
how much they initially love each other in period 1, a1; rij and a1 are
assumed to be independent.4 Unfortunately, initial love, a1, is a noisy
signal of how much they will love each other in period 2, a 2.
4
In cases in which it is clear that the notation applies to both individuals, I drop the i
and j subscripts. All variables are given per person. A timing of events table for the model
is available in Hess (2002).
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Each individual, k p i, j, also learns in period 0 the present value of
his or her expected lifetime earnings, ȳi. A fraction v of this income is
earned in period 1, and the remaining (1 ⫺ v) fraction is earned in
period 2. Each individual has a random income error in each period
(t), etk, so that actual income in each period is y k p ¯yk ⫹ etk, where
E 0(e1k) p 0, E 1(e 2k) p 0, and Var (eti) p jk2. To keep the expected present discounted value of income ﬁxed at ȳk as of period 1, regardless of
when it was earned, I assume that each agent receives vy k in period 1
and (1 ⫺ v)(1 ⫹ r)y k in period 2, where 1 ⫹ r is the risk-free gross rate
of return. Individuals receive labor income in periods 1 and 2 yet decide
whether or not to marry in period 0. Further, for simplicity, I assume
that agents have only one opportunity to marry and that if they marry
they share resources evenly. I discuss the terms of marriage adopted in
the paper below.
In period 1, all individuals observe the realized shocks to their inM
NM
comes, e1k, and each consumes c 1k
if married and c 1k
if unmarried.
Depending on the timing of income, v, each agent will borrow or save.
In period 2, if the agents are married, they learn how much they will
love each other in period 2. Love is assumed to follow the exogenous
process
a 2 p da1 ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)a ⫹ n,

(1)

where n is a random disturbance unknown to either agent in period 1
but learned by both before period 2. Namely, E t(n) p 0, for t p 0, 1,
and n has the cumulative density function F(n).5 The parameter d controls for the extent to which love is temporary (d r 0) or permanent
(d r 1).6 After learning n, but before observing their second-period income shocks, e 2i and e 2j, couples decide whether to divorce or stay marD
M
ried. After this decision, each consumes c 2k
and c 2k
, respectively. If they
NM
have never married, each simply consumes c 2k in period 2.
The model’s marital institutions are as follows: First, if i and j are
married, they consume out of their joint resources, including both income and savings, and maximize their joint welfare for as long as they
are married. Within marriage, each individual’s utility is weighted
equally. Second, if i and j marry in period 1, they each receive a1. If
they do not marry, they receive no love. If the couple marries in period
1 and subsequently divorces in period 2, the individuals receive no love
in period 2 and they must pay the utility cost f to divorce. Third, divorce
agreements are assumed to split evenly marital savings as well as all
5

Love and all income characteristics are assumed to be independent.
William Shakespeare’s view appears to be that love is quite permanent: “Love’s not
Time’s fool, though rosy lips and cheeks / Within his bending sickle’s compass come; /
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks, / But bears it out even to the edge of
doom” (sonnet 116, ll. 9–12).
6
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expected future labor earnings.7 If the partners stay married, they then
receive love a 2.
A.

The Two-Period Problem

If i and j do not marry, they individually choose the path of consumption
and savings that maximizes their individual sum of discounted utilities:

冘
2

max E 0
{c tk }

bt⫺1U(ctk) for k p i, j and 0 ! b ≤ 1

(2)

tp1

subject to their budget constraints c 1k ⫹ s k p vy k and c 2k p (1 ⫹ r)[s k ⫹
(1 ⫺ v)y k] for k p i, j.
If i and j marry, they choose the path of consumption and the decision
to remain married or divorce later to maximize their welfare. As long
as they remain married, they maximize their joint welfare out of joint
resources. Otherwise, as stated above, they evenly split their resources
(current savings and expected future income) and maximize their individual utility. Let D refer to the decision in period 2 whether to divorce
and P be the probability that they divorce.8 The probability of divorce,
P, the decision to marry, and the subsequent decision to stay married
or divorce are endogenously determined below.
The consumption decision for i, given that she is married to j, is to
choose a consumption path and divorce decision D (agent j solves a
similar problem):

(冘

max a1 ⫹ E 0 .5
{c ti,D}

{

U(c 1k) ⫹ b P 7 [⫺f ⫹ U(c 2i)] ⫹ (1 ⫺ P)

kpi,j

[

7 a 2 ⫹ .5

冘

]})

U(c 2k)

kpi,j

(3)

subject to their budget constraints in periods 1 and 2,

冘

kpi,j

c 1k ⫹

冘

kpi,j

sk p

冘

vy k ,

(4)

kpi,j

7
This latter assumption is helpful in two regards. First, it equates the marginal utility
of consumption across partners in the ﬁrst period. Second, it makes the probability of
divorce, conditional on marriage, independent of the expected level of individual resources. This is extended in Sec. IID4.
8
Since P is endogenous but does not depend on a consumption choice variable (see
expression [9] below), the expected marginal utility of consumption is the same whether
one remains married or divorces. Furthermore, given the certainty equivalent speciﬁcation
of the utility function assumed, the results are unaffected if expression (3) is changed so
that in period 1 individuals i and j jointly maximize their expected welfare even when
they are divorced in period 2.
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{

[冘
[冘

b⫺1 .5

]

s k ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)(y¯ij ⫹ ei)

kpi,j

s k ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)(y¯ij ⫹

b⫺1
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kpi,j

if i and j divorce

冘 ]

ek) ⫺ c 2j

otherwise,

kpi,j

where ¯yij is their average joint expected income, ¯yij p .5 冘kpi,j ¯yk.
B.

The Second-Period Consumption Problem and the Decision to Divorce

The model is solved recursively. In period 2, after i and j have learned
of their new love for one another, a 2, i and j make the decision to stay
married or not. To simplify, I assume that the utility function is quadratic,
U(c) p c ⫺ (b/2)c 2, which provides certainty equivalence. In addition, I
assume that the discount factor is the reciprocal of the gross interest
rate, b⫺1 p 1 ⫹ r.
If the kth individual has never married (NM), then period 2 consumption is
NM
c 2k
p b⫺1[s NM ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)y k],

k p i, j.

(5)

If a couple was married in period 1, yet, having learned n, decides to
divorce and pay the utility cost f, the period 2 consumption level for
individual k p i, j is
D
c 2k
p b⫺1[s D ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)(y¯ij ⫹ ek)],

(6)

where s D p .5 冘kpi,j s kM. Recall that if divorced, i and j equally divide total
savings, 冘kpi,j s kM, and fully share their expected future labor incomes.
If i and j are married and choose not to get divorced (denoted in
period 2 by M), they maximize their equally weighted, joint welfare:
max a 2 ⫹ .5
{c 2k }

subject to

冘

kpi,j

冘

U(c 2k)

(7)

kpi,j

c 2k p b⫺1

冘

[s kM ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)y k].

(8)

kpi,j

The ﬁrst-order condition is for the married individuals to equate their
M
D
marginal utilities, U (c 2iM) p U (c 2jM). By implication, E(c 2k
) p E(c 2k
) for
k p i, j. This result is a property of the sharing rules for divorce and
marriage and the fact that divorce is assumed to have only a utility cost
but not a ﬁnancial cost.
M
D
The decision to divorce hinges on whether U(c 2k
) ! U(c 2k
) for either
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k p i, j. It is determined by the second-period shock to love, n, namely,
divorce if either
n ! ⫺[da1 ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)a ⫹ f ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2b⫺1zji2(1 ⫺ Q)] { nˆ i

(9)

or
n ! ⫺[da1 ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)a ⫹ f ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2b⫺1zF 2ji2(1 ⫺ Q)] { nˆ j
and remain married otherwise, where z p b⫺1(b/2), Q p (1 ⫹ 2rijF ⫹
F 2 )/4, rij is the correlation of their income shocks, and F is the ratio
of their standard deviations, F p jj /ji.
Four important aspects of the model are worth noting. First, Q provides a measure of the hedging beneﬁt since as r rises, married individuals become worse hedges for one another and Q rises.9 Second, if
v p 1, so that all income is earned in period 1, then economic factors
play no direct role in the period 2 decision to divorce or stay married.10
Third, if d p 0 so that all ﬂuctuations in love are temporary, a couple’s
initial level of love has no effect on its decision whether or not to divorce.
Finally, because of the assumption that couples share lifetime expected
labor resources even if they divorce, consumption-utility levels will be
the same regardless of whether the couple divorces or stays married.
Given the couples’ parameters (a1, rij, ¯yk, and jk, for k p i, j) and the
technology and institutional parameters (d, v, and f), n̂ is deﬁned as
the worst shock to their love that i and j can receive and still remain
married. Since, in general, individuals will have different expected income volatilities, F ( 1, each individual within a marriage will have a
different threshold point. Thus we must consider the highest threshold
(i.e., the greatest lower bound for love) between the two partners,
namely, nˆ p max (nˆ i, nˆ j). The probability of divorce is then P p
n̂
ˆ .
∫⫺⬁ dF(n) p F(n)
C.

The First-Period Consumption Problem and the Decision to Marry

Having solved the period 2 consumption problem and the decision to
stay married or to divorce, I now solve the period 1 consumption problem. In period 1, both i and j know each other’s economic characteristics
and the initial level of love they have for each other, a1. Below, I examine
their consumption and welfare levels over periods 1 and 2 under both
marriage and nonmarriage conditions to solve their decision to get
married.
9
For example, if F p 1, then Q p 1 when incomes are perfectly positively correlated
and Q p 0 when incomes are perfectly negatively correlated.
10
However, economic factors will have an indirect effect, since love may be substituted
for economic factors in period 1.
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If i and j do not marry, they individually maximize (2). Given the
assumption that the discount factor equals the inverse of the interest
rate factor, the optimality condition is that U (c 1iNM) p E 1U (c 2iNM). Once
the period 1 income shock is observed, the consumption solution is
c 1iNM p E 1(c 2iNM) p

( )

1
(y¯i ⫹ ve1i).
1⫹b

(10)

Prior to their learning their period 1 income shocks, the expected welfare levels for individuals i and j if they do not marry are, respectively,
E(WiNM) p ¯yi(1 ⫺ wy¯i) ⫺ ji2[wv 2 ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2z]

(11)

E(Wj NM) p ¯yj(1 ⫺ wy¯j) ⫺ ji2 F 2[wv 2 ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2z],

(12)

and

where w p (b/2)/(1 ⫹ b).
If i and j do marry, they maximize (3) subject to (4). The solution
M
M
for the consumption path c 1k
and c 2k
, k p i, j, is to equate marginal
utility across partners in period 1, along with expected marginal utility
in period 2:
c 1iM p E 1(c 2i) p c 1jM p E 1(c 2j) p

( )(
1
1⫹b

¯yij ⫹

冘 )

v
e .
2 kpi,j 1k

(13)

According to equation (13), each individual in a marriage smooths his
or her consumption across time, knowing that all labor resources earned
in period 1, all marital savings, and all expected future labor income
are shared if the partners divorce.
The expected utility from marrying, conditional on learning a1, ¯yk,
and jk for k p i, j and rij, is

(

{

E(WiM) p a1 ⫹ b ⫺f 7 P ⫹ (1 ⫺ P) 7 da1 ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)a

冕

⬁

ˆ ⫺1
⫹ [1 ⫺ F(n)]

n̂

})

ndF(n) ⫹ ¯yij(1 ⫺ wy¯ij)

⫺ ji2{v 2 Qw ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2z[P ⫹ (1 ⫺ P) 7 Q]}

(14)

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 15:35:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

298

journal of political economy

and

(

{

E(Wj M) p a1 ⫹ b ⫺f 7 P ⫹ (1 ⫺ P) 7 da1 ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)a

冕

⬁

ˆ ⫺1
⫹ [1 ⫺ F(n)]

n̂

})

ndF(n) ⫹ ¯yij(1 ⫺ wy¯ij)

⫺ F 2ji2{v 2 Qw ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2z[P ⫹ (1 ⫺ P)Q]},

(15)

where P is derived above. The decision to get married is therefore to
marry if E(WkM) ≥ E(WkNM) for both individuals and to not marry otherwise and is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Two individuals are less likely to marry the more
correlated their earnings are, the greater the difference in their expected earnings, and the greater the difference in the uncertainty about
their individual earnings.
On the basis of the decision to marry and the welfare from not marrying, expressions (11), (12), (14), and (15), proposition 1 follows directly. First, the more positively correlated individuals’ incomes are, the
poorer the individuals are at providing income insurance for one another. Second, if two individuals are identical in all respects except mean
income, one must wonder why the individual with a higher income
would ever agree to marriage.11 The answer is that without a great deal
of mutual love, she will not, and the likelihood becomes less likely the
bigger the income differential. As a result, they will be less likely to
marry. Finally, the implication that a greater difference in earnings uncertainty lowers the likelihood of marriage follows similarly.
Interestingly, love allows individuals to marry spouses who may not
improve and could even worsen their economic outlook, for example,
a poor hedge, or someone with more volatile income and fewer expected
resources. Whether or not this results in longer-lasting marriages, of
course, depends on the willingness of individuals to substitute economic
characteristics for initial love. It will also depend on how long the love
between the couple is expected to last, d, and the fraction of labor
income that is earned in the future, v.
D.

The Decision to Divorce

This subsection examines the properties that govern whether partners
who marry will stay married or divorce. I inspect each mechanism
separately.
11

One can think of this as “Why would a millionaire want to marry you?”
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The Impact of Income Correlation on the Probability of Divorce

In this subsection I analyze the impact of more correlated incomes on
the decision to stay married or divorce. To isolate this feature, I assume
that individuals have the same mean incomes (¯yi p ¯yj) and variances
(F p 1). In this case, individuals i and j will have the same threshold
love shock levels, n̂. As of period 1, an increase in rij affects the probability
of divorce as follows:
ˆ
dF(n)
⭸nˆ
⭸nˆ ⭸a1
ˆ 7
p F (n)
⫹
7
.
drij
⭸rij
⭸a1 ⭸rij

[ (

)]

(16)

This total effect takes into account that individuals must still ﬁnd it
incentive compatible to get married in the ﬁrst place, E(WkM) ≥
E(WkNM) for k p i, j. The term in brackets is the total effect of a change
in rij on the threshold love shock nˆ . The ﬁrst term is the direct effect
that a change in rij has on the threshold love shock. The second term
is the effect of an increase in rij inducing a substitution toward more
initial love, which will indirectly affect the threshold level of love in
period 2. Note that love and hedging have the following effects on this
ˆ
ˆ ij p [(1 ⫺
threshold level of love: ⭸n/⭸a
and ⭸n/⭸r
1 p ⫺d ! 0
v)2zb⫺1ji2 ]/2 1 0.
When we solve for the “love-correlation” trade-off, ⭸a1 /⭸rij, by differentiating expression (14) given the constraint that E(W M) ≥ E(W NM),
the solution to (16) is
ˆ
ˆ
dF(n)
ji2
v 2 w ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2z[1 ⫺ P(n)]
ˆ
p F (n)
F b⫺1(1 ⫺ v)2z ⫺ d
ˆ
drij
2
1 ⫹ bd[1 ⫺ P(n)]

()(

ⱞ 0.

{

})
(17)

The ﬁrst term inside the large parentheses is positive and reﬂects the
costs of having a partner who is a poorer hedge (i.e., higher rij) in
period 2. This term goes to zero as v approaches one, since the role of
a hedge is no longer needed in the future if all permanent income
uncertainty has been resolved. The second term inside the large parentheses is negative and reﬂects the fact that having a partner who is
a poorer hedge makes an individual require more love in period 1 to
get married. The fact that being a poorer hedge “crowds in” initial love
will be more important for keeping marriages together as initial love
becomes more persistent and there is less uncertainty to future income.
More generally, the derivative is decreasing as either d or v is increasing.
When we substitute terms, the sign of (17) depends critically on the
magnitudes of v, d, and b, as the following proposition indicates.
Proposition 2. An increase in the correlation of couples’ individual
incomes, rij, will raise, lower, or have no effect on the probability of
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divorce if the fraction of income that is earned early in life, v, satisﬁes
v ! v∗, v 1 v∗, or v p v∗, respectively, where v∗(d, b) p 冑1 ⫹ b/(b冑d ⫹
冑1 ⫹ b).
Note that if either the persistence of love, d, is sufﬁciently low or the
fraction of income that is earned early in life, v, is sufﬁciently low, then
v ! v∗, and an increase in the correlation of couples’ individual income
will raise the probability of divorce. The intuition is that since initial
love is temporary or there remains a strong demand for income insurance in period 2, couples that marry in period 1, despite having highly
correlated incomes, will do so early only if they start out with a very
high initial amount of love. However, because this love is not likely to
last and couples have a strong continued need for income insurance,
they will be more likely to divorce than couples that started out as good
hedges for one another. Moreover, even if love is permanent, d p 1,
ˆ drij 1 0 for all v ! 冑1 ⫹ b/(b ⫹ 冑1 ⫹ b). The intuition is clearest for
dF(n)/
v p 0. In this case, since couples that marry expect to get love in periods
1 and 2, a large fraction of the expected present value of love has already
been enjoyed by the time the decision to stay married has to take place,
and no income uncertainty has been resolved. Hence, in period 2, income insurance becomes relatively more important in the decision to
stay married.
In contrast, if most income uncertainty has been resolved in period
1 and initial love is relatively permanent, then v 1 v∗. Indeed, for this
case, those who are better hedges tend to have less love initially and
hence are more susceptible to a love shortfall in period 2 as long as
love is sufﬁciently persistent. Hence, for this case, marriage between
partners who are good hedges will actually have a shorter expected
duration, as initial love becomes more important in the decision whether
to stay married.
2.

The Impact of Income Uncertainty on the Probability of Divorce

While the discussion so far has focused on the correlation of the partners’ incomes, one can repeat the exercise considering individuals who
are the same in all respects except income volatility. Let F ≥ 1, so that
conditional on WkM ≥ WkNM for k p i, j, the effect of an increase in the
difference of income uncertainty on the probability of divorce is
dF(nˆ i)
j2
v 2 w ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)2z[1 ⫺ P(nˆ i)]
p F (nˆ i) i (F ⫹ rij) b⫺1(1 ⫺ v)2z ⫺ d
dF
2
1 ⫹ bd[1 ⫺ P(nˆ i)]

()

(

{

})

ⱞ 0,

ˆ dF depends critically on the magwhere F ⫹ rij 1 0. The sign of dF(n)/
nitudes of v, d, and b, as the following proposition indicates.
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Proposition 3. An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual
income uncertainties, F, will raise, lower, or have no effect on the probability of divorce if the fraction of income that is earned early in life,
v, satisﬁes v ! v∗, v 1 v∗, or v p v∗, respectively, where v∗(d, b) p
冑1 ⫹ b/(b冑d ⫹ 冑1 ⫹ b).
The intuition follows that for proposition 2: If a couple differs greatly
in the volatility of its partners’ incomes, one must consider why the
individual with stable income married the individual with the volatile
one. The answer lies in the fact that the low-volatility individual must
have been compensated with a large initial level of mutual love. If initial
love is transitory or a large fraction of permanent income is still to be
earned, then this couple is more likely to divorce because there will not
be enough love in the future to compensate the individual with lower
income risk. In contrast, if initial love is persistent and little income is
left to be earned in the future, then the couple will be less likely to run
short of love and divorce.
3.

Spousal Mean Income Differences and the Probability of Divorce

The conditions that affect the impact of mean income differences on
the probability of divorce depend critically on the way in which divorce
agreements split marital income. Since all expected future labor income
is shared once married in the model presented here, there is no direct
effect of expected income differences on the probability of divorce and
on the threshold levels for the love shock, n̂ (see expression [9]). However, differences in mean income do have an indirect effect on the
probability of divorce since they will induce a substitution effect toward
a higher initial level of love. If this love is permanent (d is high), then
we should expect marriages with larger mean income differences between partners to have lower probabilities of divorce. This holds regardless of v. If love is temporary, however, then differences in spousal
mean income will not help in predicting marital durations.
The total effect of an increase in i’s expected income relative to j’s
is, conditional on WkM ≥ WkNM for k p i, j and ¯yi ≥ ¯yj,12

F

dF(nˆ i)
d ¯yi

F

ȳipȳij

{

ˆ
p F (n)(1
⫺ 2wy¯ij)

}

⫺d/2
≤ 0.
ˆ
1 ⫹ bd[1 ⫺ P(n)]

(18)

The following proposition classiﬁes how love affects the impact of larger
differences in mean incomes on marital duration.
Proposition 4. An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual
12
The term 1 ⫺ 2wy¯ij is assumed to be positive as a consequence of obtaining an interior
solution with quadratic utility.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 15:35:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

302

journal of political economy

mean incomes will lower the probability of divorce if d 1 0 and will have
no effect if d p 0.
4.

The Imperfect Sharing of Expected Future Resources in the
Case of Divorce

An important simplifying assumption is that all remaining expected
permanent income is shared if a married couple divorces in period 2.
Consequently, proposition 4 indicates that even when love is temporary,
a big difference in spouses’ expected future incomes is not a harbinger
of future divorce. This would not be the case, however, if couples did
not fully share their expected future incomes in the case of divorce.
To focus on this issue, assume that couples differ only in their mean
incomes and that there is no income uncertainty. While I maintain the
assumption that marital assets, 冘kpi,j s kM, are shared at the time of divorce,
let x be the fraction of future permanent income remaining that an
individual does not share with his or her partner if they divorce. Also,
let individual i have the higher income, so that i has the binding reservation love level:
n̂ p z[1 ⫺ b(x ⫹ z)] ⫺ f ⫺ a1 d ⫺ a(1 ⫺ d),

(19)

where z p b (1 ⫺ v)x(y¯i ⫺ ¯yij) and x p b [(1 ⫺ v)y¯i ⫺ .5 冘kp1 s kM].13
Note that, unlike before, the probability of divorce depends on agent
i’s and j’s consumption-savings decisions in period 1.
Now, reconsider the case in which i and j marry in period 0 and then
must optimally choose to stay married or divorce in period 2. Assume
that the shocks to love are uniformly distributed over the interval [⫺D,
ˆ
D], so that P p [1 ⫹ (n/D)]/2
, where nˆ is deﬁned in (19). When the
steps outlined earlier in the paper are repeated, optimal consumption
in period 2 for the case in which i and j remain married is
⫺1

⫺1

2

c 2iM p c 2jM p b⫺1[A ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)]y¯ij .
In the case of divorce, the optimal consumption levels for i and j are,
respectively,
c 2iD p b⫺1[A ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)]y¯ij ⫹ z
and
c 2jD p b⫺1[A ⫹ (1 ⫺ v)]y¯ij ⫺ z.
When these consumption values are plugged into the welfare functions
13
When the maximization steps outlined earlier in the paper are repeated, average
savings at the end of period 1 are 12 kpi,j skM p A 7 ¯yij, where A p [v ⫺ b ⫺1(1 ⫺
v)B]/(1 ⫹ b ⫺1B) and B p 1 ⫹ (bz 2/2D).

冘
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for marriage and no marriage as of period 1, expressions (2) and (3),
respectively, an increase in ȳi affects the probability of divorce as follows:

F F
ˆ
dF(n)
d ¯yi

ˆ 7 (1 ⫺ 2wy¯ij)
p F (n)
ȳipȳij

{

7 b⫺1 x(1 ⫺ v) ⫹

ˆ
⫺(d/2) ⫹ dP(n)x(1
⫺ v)
ⱞ 0.
ˆ
1 ⫹ b[1 ⫺ dP(n)]

}

(20)

Note that as x r 0, expression (20) collapses to expression (18). The
ﬁrst term inside the braces is the period 2 direct effect of how a change
in individual i’s expected income affects the probability of staying marˆ ¯i. In this case, a rise in i’s expected resources will
ried, namely, ⭸n/⭸y
raise the net economic beneﬁts to divorce in period 2 and hence should
raise the probability of divorce.
The second term of expression (20)—the fraction—is the effect of a
rise in i’s expected resources on the probability of divorce that works
indirectly through the decision to get married. Its ﬁrst term indicates
that as long as initial love has some persistence, then marriages with
larger differences in mean incomes between partners should have more
love and hence be less likely to end in divorce. Its second term captures
the effect that the incomplete sharing of expected resources in the case
of divorce raises the economic returns to marriage for the better-off
individual. Hence, they can settle for a smaller amount of initial love
since they still retain the option to divorce. The derivative is decreasing
as either d or v is increasing or x is decreasing. Which effect dominates
is considered in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual
mean incomes will raise, lower, or have no effect on the probability of
divorce if the fraction of income that is earned early in life, v, satisﬁes
v ! v , v 1 v , or v p v , respectively, where v (d, b, x) p 1 ⫺ {d/[2(1 ⫹
b⫺1)x]}.
If initial love is sufﬁciently temporary and expected future resources
are relatively similar whether one stays married or divorces, there will
be a zero impact from larger expected income differences on the probability of divorce. Such an impact can also be obtained, more generally,
as long as d ≈ 2(1 ⫹ b⫺1)x(1 ⫺ v); namely, love’s persistence, d, is proportional to the amount of unshared lifetime resources in the case of
divorce, x(1 ⫺ v).14 Note that even if love is permanent, d p 1, the impact on the duration of marriage from an increase in the gap between
14

Note that v ∗ ⱞ v  as

冑1 ⫹ b
b冑d ⫹ 冑1 ⫹ b

⫹

d
ⱞ 1.
2(1 ⫹ b ⫺1)x
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the couple’s individual mean incomes could be zero as long as the
expected amount of unshared expected lifetime resources is sufﬁciently
large. Also, as in proposition 4, there can also be a negative impact of
larger expected income differences on the probability of divorce if love
is permanent and expected future resources are relatively similar
whether one stays married or divorces. In contrast to proposition 4,
however, there can be a positive impact from larger expected income
differences on the probability of divorce if love is temporary or expected
future resources are relatively dissimilar whether one stays married or
divorces.
III.

Empirical Results

In this section I test the broad implications of the theory using data on
ﬁrst marriages from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
for the years 1978–94. Since potential pairings of individuals are not
observed in the data set, I test only the model’s implications for couples
that actually do get married: propositions 2–5. The following subsections
provide the paper’s estimation strategy, data, and empirical ﬁndings.
A.

Econometric Strategy

I investigate the impact of joint spousal economic characteristics (E)—
income correlations (CORR), their relative volatilities (VGAP), and
mean differences (MGAP)—on the duration of marriages and hence
on the probability of divorce and the duration of marriage. Of course,
the duration of a marriage will likely depend on a number of other
observed individual as well as joint noneconomic characteristics. Hence,
the empirical speciﬁcation for marital durations will also include individual characteristics (I) as well as joint noneconomic characteristics
(J).
It is critical to note that the model’s predictions concerning the likelihood of divorce and the temporal persistence of love depend on the
fact that these joint economic characteristics are substituted for love at
the time of marriage. Accordingly, these expected income characteristics
for each marriage should be based on information assumed to be known
at the beginning of each marriage. Unfortunately, however, these joint
economic characteristics (E) are measured only throughout the marriage. As such, using simple measures of these characteristics in a duration model may induce an endogeneity bias to the results. To overcome this potential bias, I generate predicted values for these economic
characteristics, denoted Ê, based only on data known at the beginning
of the marriage. To implement this approach I use marital occupation
pairs of spouses from the beginning of a marriage to predict the joint
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economic characteristics (E) under the identifying restriction that they
affect the probability of divorce only through their impact on remaining
lifetime income characteristics. The details of this identifying structure,
and other econometric issues, are discussed in subsections C and D
below.
When a Cox proportional hazard model is adopted, the hazard function for the ith marriage is related to the hazard rate according to
l(t i, X i) p l(t i, 0) exp [g (X i)], where the vector g contains the parameters to be estimated.15 To test the theory’s predictions, g X i is speciﬁed
as16
 i ⫹ g2 7 MGAP
 i ⫹ g3 7 VGAP
 i ⫹ g4 7 I i ⫹ g5 7 Ji.
g X i p g1 7 CORR

(21)

According to the theory as summarized by propositions 2–5, the estimates of g1, g2, and g3 should be negative if love is permanent and
future income (both shared and unshared) is relatively unimportant in
income considerations. In contrast, if love is temporary or future income
is important in permanent income considerations, then g1 and g3 should
be positive; if love is temporary, then g2 should be positive if unshared
expected lifetime resources in the case of divorce are large. It is also
possible for g2 to be zero, namely, if love’s persistence is proportional
to the amount of unshared expected lifetime resources in the case of
divorce. Importantly, if these resources are small as a consequence of
more equitable divorce agreements, then g2 equal to zero would be
direct evidence that love is temporary.17

B.

The Data

The unit of observation is a marriage. The key datum for the dependent
variable in this empirical study is whether a marriage ends in divorce
(DIVp1) or not. For each marriage, the maximum duration observed
of a given couple’s marriage is denoted MAXDUR, which is equal to
the uncensored duration of the marriage if it ends in divorce and is
otherwise equal to the censored duration of the marriage in 1994 when
the sample ends. The data set contains demographic, income, and mar15
The proportional hazard model is a partial likelihood function approach to estimate
the parameters g, without estimating the baseline hazard l(ti, 0), which contains the
individual heterogeneity. Similar ﬁndings were also obtained from exponential, Weibull,
and log-logistic speciﬁcations of the hazard function.
16
I also allowed for time-dependent covariates for each individual characteristic in the
hazard model (not shown). None were statistically signiﬁcant at below the .1 level.
17
The amount of remaining income uncertainty might be quite large given that the
 is imdata set focuses on young respondents. That is why the evidence for MGAP
portant for establishing the possibility that love is temporary.
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ital information for both respondents.18 It also contains a reduced set
of this information for their spouses. After missing data, respondents
who became widowed or were never married, and so forth are removed,
the sample is approximately 1,200 observations (ﬁrst marriages).19
For general demographic information used as explanatory variables, I
include a number of variables used in prior studies: a dummy variable
for whether the spouses attended a two- or four-year college at the beginning of the marriage (EDMp1 for the male and EDWp1 for the
female), whether there were no dependents in the household at the
beginning of the marriage (NOKIDSp1), a dummy variable for whether
a spouse was 25 years of age or older when ﬁrst married (AGEMp1 for
the male and AGEFp1 for the female), the race of the respondent
(WHITEp1), whether the respondent was raised Catholic (CATHOLICp1), and whether the respondent’s parents are divorced at the beginning of the respondent’s marriage (PARDIVp1).20 The NLSY also
provides each partner’s reported occupation at the time of the marriage:
MMAROCC is the vector of 10 dummy variables for the male partner’s
marital occupation, and FMAROCC is that for females.21
From the data, I calculate for each marriage the mean, variance, and
correlation of the partners’ incomes. On the basis of income data from
the respondent and his or her spouse, the partners’ observed income
correlation (CORR i) was calculated. Moreover, the mean income gap
(MGAP) was measured as the absolute value of the difference of the
means as suggested by the deﬁnition of z in Section IID4. The income
variance gap (VGAP) is measured as the ratio of the higher value in
the marriage to the lower value in the marriage, as suggested by the
deﬁnition of F.22
18
The income data were converted to real by dividing by the 1994-based, chain-weighted
gross domestic product deﬂator.
19
I consider data for only ﬁrst marriages, though I empirically explore second marriages
below at the end of Sec. IIID and the results in col. 5 of table 4.
20
The results are similar if I use the number of children at the beginning of marriage
as opposed to a dummy variable to distinguish between zero and the presence of children.
Also, similar results were obtained both when age was measured continuously and when
multiple age dummies were used: under 21, between 21 and under 25, and then over 25
when ﬁrst married did not affect the result.
21
The NLSY reports each partner’s current occupation, which is then classiﬁed into 10
groupings. The listed occupations in the NLSY (with occupational classiﬁcation codes in
parentheses) are [1] professional, technical, and kindred (001–195); [2] managers, ofﬁcials, and proprietors (201–45); [3] sales workers (260–85); [4] clerical and kindred (301–
95); [5] craftsmen, foremen, and kindred (401–575); [6] operatives and kindred (601–
715); [7] laborers, except farm (740–85); [8] farmers, farm managers, farm laborers, and
foremen (801–24); [9] service workers, except private household (901–65); and [10]
private household (980–84). In a few instances, the respondent’s occupation for the year
of the marriage was not reported, so the occupation for the prior year was used.
22
Explicitly, MGAP p Fy¯i ⫺ ¯yjF and VGAP p max (ji2/jj2, jj2/ji2). Other approaches to
empirically deﬁning the disparity of means and variances across partners were used, such
as the absolute value of the difference or the absolute value of the difference scaled by
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TABLE 1
Sample Statistics
Correlations

Series

Mean
(1)

Standard
Error
(2)

Median
(3)

CORR
(4)

MGAP
(5)

VGAP
(6)

DIV
MAXDUR
WHITE
AGEM
AGEF
EDM
EDW
NOKIDS
CATHOLIC
PARDIV
CORR
MGAP
VGAP

.292
9.815
.671
.310
.133
.277
.259
.761
.380
.150
.216
12.692
19.021

.455
4.158
.470
.463
.339
.448
.438
.427
.486
.357
.524
11.689
22.532

.000
10.000
1.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
.000
.000
.301
10.125
3.033

.093
⫺.118
⫺.128
⫺.069
⫺.049
⫺.009
⫺.036
⫺.095
.032
.003
1.000
⫺.129
.049

⫺.043
.061
.139
.119
.041
.169
⫺.033
.081
.045
.034

.057
⫺.087
.026
⫺.014
.065
⫺.026
⫺.026
⫺.048
⫺.007
⫺.018

1.000
.073

1.000

Note.—See the text for a data description. The number of observations is 1,207. Cols. 4–6 are the correlations of
the variable listed at the top of the column with the variable listed in the row. The variables are whether the respondent
was white (WHITE), the partners’ ages when married (AGEFp1 for the female and AGEMp1 for the male if 25 or
older), whether the partners attended a two- or four-year college (EDFp1 for the female and EDMp1 for the male),
whether the respondent’s parents divorced (PARDIVp1), and whether the respondent was raised Catholic (CATHOLICp1). CORR is the correlation of the partner’s income, MGAP is the absolute value of the mean gap in their income,
and VGAP is the ratio of the partners’ highest to lowest volatilities.

Table 1 present statistics for the data for the marriages and marital
economic characteristics used in this study. Columns 1–3 report the
mean, standard deviation, and median. About 30 percent of ﬁrst marriages failed by 1994, whereas only 15 percent of the respondents’ parents divorced. The sample is over 65 percent white, over 35 percent
Catholic, and quite young when ﬁrst married. These latter two features
are likely driven by the fact that the survey pertains to young people.
Finally, approximately 30 percent of the male and female spouses have
attended a two- or four-year college at some point by the time of their
marriage, and approximately 80 percent of these ﬁrst marriages begin
without dependents. The average correlation is around .2, the average
mean income gap is approximately $12,000, and the average ratio of
the highest to the lowest income variances is approximately 19.23
Columns 4–6 report the correlation coefﬁcients between the data and
the three key observed economic characteristics, E. In general, the unconditional correlations between divorce and the predicted income
characteristics for correlation and volatility are positive and relatively
the sum of the two partners’ variables. The ﬁndings of this paper do not depend on the
method chosen to measure these disparities.
23
While the predicted correlation is low, this is consistent with the ﬁnding of Dynarski
and Gruber (1997). They ﬁnd that a wife’s labor income does not appreciably affect the
smoothness of the head’s labor income. However, if the correlation between the head’s
and wife’s incomes is less than one, marriage will still provide a consumption-insurance
beneﬁt.
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large, and the mean gap has a negative, though smaller, correlation
with divorce. As well, spouses with larger gaps in their mean incomes
tend to have more negatively correlated incomes and smaller gaps in
their income variances. The remaining correlations between the income
variables and the other characteristics are directly related to the empirical results in table 2 below.

C.

Construction of Economic Characteristics at the Start of a Marriage

To ensure that the marital income characteristics are based on available
information at the time of the beginning of the marriage, the predicted
income characteristics for the marriage will be projected from those
characteristics observed at the beginning of a couple’s marriage. Consider ﬁrst the predicted income correlation for each ith marriage. After
calculation of the partners’ observed income correlation (CORR i), the
 i) was obtained from the
predicted income correlation variable (CORR
ﬁtted value of the following linear regression:
CORR i p A(I i, Ji, Z i) ⫹ u i,

(22)

where A represents the linear coefﬁcients to be estimated. The ﬁtted
 i, are therefore the predicted correvalues from this regression, CORR
lation of the partners’ incomes based on information at the beginning
of the marriage. Similarly, the predicted gaps in mean incomes
 ) and volatilities (VGAP
 ) were constructed. Hence, for each
(MGAP
marriage, there is a vector of observed and predicted joint economic
characteristics, E and Ê.
The explanatory variables in regression (22) warrant discussion. The
vector I represents a constant as well as the following available individual
characteristics: AGEMi, AGEWi, EDMi, EDWi, CATHOLICi, PARDIVi,
NOKIDSi, MMAROCCi, and FMAROCCi. The vector J represents the
available noneconomic cross-spouse characteristics that are independent of I, namely, those components of AGEMi # AGEWi # EDMi #
EDWi.
Essential to using these generated economic characteristics in our
duration estimation, however, is that we identify some variables (Z) that
can predict the observed joint economic characteristics (E) but do not
directly affect the duration of marriage. The term Z represents the
critical joint marital occupation variables that are linearly independent
of I and J and can predict the joint economic characteristics (E) but
are assumed not to directly affect the duration of marriage, namely,
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MMAROCCi # FMAROCCi.24 The identifying assumption that occupational pairings of spouses affect the probability of divorce only though
their impact on the economic characteristics of remaining lifetime income is critical for using the model to interpret the marriage duration
results presented below.
There are two major reasons why cross-marital occupation variables
at the time of marriage are used to identify the joint economic characteristics. First, these combined occupation dummy variables,
MMAROCC # WMAROCC, would be expected to be important predictors of a marriage’s joint economic characteristics, E, throughout the
marriage as long as incomes are subject to occupation-speciﬁc shocks.
Indeed, this point is demonstrated in table 2; namely, these joint marital
occupation dummy variables have signiﬁcant explanatory power in predicting the joint economic characteristics.
Second, it is not likely that joint marital occupation variables will have
a signiﬁcant remaining effect on the duration speciﬁcation, equation
(21), outside of their effect on the key joint economic characteristics
for two key reasons. First, the duration equation itself includes each
partner’s individual marital occupation dummy variable in I i. Second,
the duration equation already contains variables in I i and Ji individual
as well as joint noneconomic characteristics that are likely to be important determinants of the observed heterogeneity in both marital
duration and joint economic characteristics. Hence, it is unlikely that
the key ﬁndings below are due to the omission of variables, such as
those in Z, from the duration speciﬁcation. However, to guard further
against the remote possibility that these cross-spouse industry variables
embody relevant unobserved cross-spouse heterogeneity that is relevant
for marital duration independent of their inﬂuence on the joint economic characteristics, in table 4 below I provide a number of modiﬁcations to the basic speciﬁcation to test this identiﬁcation’s sturdiness.
The estimates of equation (22) for the joint economic characteristics
(E) are presented in table 2. To conserve space, I report p-values for Ftests for the signiﬁcance of a number of relevant variables in the speciﬁcation (22). In particular, p-value (CROSS OCC [59]) tests whether
the coefﬁcients on the linearly independent marital occupation interaction terms in Z are jointly equal to zero. This p-value statistic for the
signiﬁcance of the cross-spouse occupation variables will be useful for
24
Note that out of a possible 16 (2 4 ) combinations of interactions of the sex-speciﬁc
age and education dummy variables in J, 11 are linearly independent of the individual
age and education dummy variables in I. Out of a possible 10#10 combinations of male
and female marital occupations, 59 both are observed in the sample and are linearly
independent of the individual marital occupation variables MMAROCC and FMAROCC
in I.
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TABLE 2
Economic Variables Projected on Initial Marital Characteristics
(Np1,207; 98 Regressors)
Dependent Variable

Explanatory
Variable
Constant
AGEM
AGEW
EDM
EDW
WHITE
NOKIDS
CATHOLIC
PARDIV
R2
p-value (OCC [18])
p-value (AGE [12])
p-value (ED [12])
p-value (CROSS OCC
[59])
p-value (CROSS AGE
and ED [9])

CORR
(1)

MGAP
(2)

VGAP
(3)

.186
(.403)
⫺.103**
(.052)
⫺.178**
(.081)
⫺.035
(.054)
⫺.022
(.048)
⫺.123***

8.359***
(1.052)
.532
(.965)
⫺1.941
(1.413)
1.845
(1.239)
⫺2.483***
(.961)
3.107***
(.677)
.560
(.793)
1.736**
(.708)
1.567*
(.890)
.177
.006
.036
.001

.250
(.173)
.030
(.125)
1.722
(1.331)
.001
(.097)
⫺.022
(.096)
.101
(.070)
⫺.173
(.168)
.010
(.056)
⫺.066
(.054)
.274
.001
.685
.641

.001

.001

.001

.029

.131

.482

⫺.098***
(.037)
⫺.005
(.032)
.002
(.041)
.123
.001
.007
.031

Note.—Standard errors, robust to possible heteroskedasticity of unknown form, are reported in parentheses. p-value
(OCC [18]) tests whether the coefﬁcients on MMAROCC and FMAROCC in I are jointly equal to zero; p-value (AGE
[12]) tests whether the coefﬁcients on all the age variables in I and J are jointly equal to zero; p-value (ED [12]) tests
whether the coefﬁcients on all the education variables in I and J are jointly equal to zero; p-value (CROSS AGE and
ED [9]) tests whether the coefﬁcients on the linearly independent age and education interactions terms in J are jointly
equal to zero; and p-value (CROSS OCC [59]) tests whether the coefﬁcients on the linearly independent interaction
terms in MMAROCC and FMAROCC in Z are jointly equal to zero. The number of restrictions for each test is reported
in brackets.
* Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .10 level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .05 level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .01 level.

identifying the independent role of the predicted income characteristics
on the duration of marriage.
Column 1 of table 2 presents the regression results when the couple’s
actual labor income correlation (CORR i) is the dependent variable.
Typically, couples in which the respondent is white, who are older when
married, and who start their marriage without children have more negatively correlated labor incomes. The p-value results from the F-statistic
also reveal that one can reject the hypothesis that the individual and
cross-marital occupational dummy variables are jointly equal to zero at
or below the .001 level of statistical signiﬁcance.
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Column 2 of table 2 reports the empirical results for equation (22)
when MGAPi is the dependent variable. Marriages in which the respondent is white, is Catholic, and has divorced parents and in which the
female spouse has not attended college are associated with larger mean
income gaps. In addition, the reported p-value reveals that one can reject
the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients on the individual and cross-spouse
marital occupational variables are jointly equal to zero at or below the
.01 level of statistical signiﬁcance. Column 3 presents the results for the
case in which the partners’ gap in the variances of their individual
incomes, VGAPi, is the dependent variable. Here, only the coefﬁcients
on the variables for the individual and cross-spouse occupation dummies
are signiﬁcantly different from zero at or below the .01 level. The R 2 is
.274, which is two times higher than for the CORR i equation (col. 1)
and about one-half higher than for the MGAP equation (col. 2).25
D.

Empirical Estimates

The use of generated economic characteristics, Ê, also introduces additional econometric wrinkles into the estimation procedure. First, as
these regressors in the duration equation have been generated from an
earlier estimation step, the standard errors in the duration equation
(i.e., the second step) must be corrected for the sampling error inherited from the imputed regressors. To correct these standard errors, I
followed Murphy and Topel (1985) by calculating the analytical and
numerical ﬁrst derivatives of the likelihood functions from the ordinary
least squares regressions of the predictions equations (22) and the duration model implied by equation (21), calculating the cross partials of
the joint likelihood functions, and then inverting the joint matrix to
obtain the standard errors for the duration equation.26
In addition, while the use of the generated regressors was predicated
on the belief that using data throughout the marriage for the economic
characteristics would be subject to endogeneity bias, such a bias can be
examined using a Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis that there
is no endogeneity bias, including the observed economic characteristics
E rather than the generated ones Ê should produce estimates of the
25
Fortunately, the regression results for MGAP are no weaker than those for CORR,
 is insigniﬁcant in determining marital durations.
since one potential ﬁnding is that MGAP
 is one way to obtain this ﬁnding.
Of course, a poorly measured MGAP
26
Two things should be noted. First, since both steps of the regression use the same
data sample, the full covariance matrix must be evaluated. See Murphy and Topel (1985,
sec. 5.1) for the formulas for the relevant matrix calculations. Second, the results for the
ﬁrst step would also be affected but are not reported again since they are not the focal
point of inquiry in this study. The size of the full estimated covariance matrix is 332#332,
where 332 reﬂects the 98 coefﬁcients in each of the three equations for constructing Ê
and the 38 coefﬁcients in the duration equation.
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impact of the economic characteristics on the duration of marriage,
which should be the same. The rows in tables 3 and 4 labeled “Hausman”
present results from such a test.27
Table 3 presents estimation results of equation (21). To conserve
space, rather than report the estimated coefﬁcients on the individual
marital occupation dummy variables and the interacted gender-speciﬁc
age and education dummy variables, I simply report at the bottom of
the table the p-values from the x 2 test of the null hypothesis that the
individual industry, age and education, and cross-spouse age and education variables are zero.
In general, the null hypothesis that the estimates of g1 and g3 are
zero can be rejected in favor of the alternative that they are greater
than zero. Furthermore, in every case the estimates of g2 are statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The former result is consistent with propositions 2 and 3 when the fraction of income risk in the future is relatively large, though it cannot by itself distinguish the absolute persistence of love. As proposition 5 suggests, however, there are two
interpretations of the latter result. One interpretation is that love is very
temporary and that the amount of unshared expected future income
in the case of divorce is small. An alternative interpretation is that the
persistence of love is proportional to the level of unshared expected
future income in the case of divorce. In this latter interpretation, the
absolute persistence of love cannot be determined. Regardless, the results clearly indicate the importance of a good match of economic characteristics for the longer expected duration of a marriage. By implication, the evidence supports the view that a good deal of initial love is
not a sufﬁcient substitute for marrying a good economic match in order
for a marriage to be expected to last longer.
For example, column 1 of table 3 provides estimates of the baseline
 is included in Eˆ in the regression.
speciﬁcation (21) when only CORR
It is striking that the more positively related the spouses’ incomes are,
the more likely that the marriage will end in divorce as the hazard rate
rises. The coefﬁcient on g1 is positive and statistically different from
zero at below the .01 level of signiﬁcance. Columns 2 and 3 provide
 and
estimates of the baseline speciﬁcation (21) when just MGAP

VGAP, respectively, are included as covariates in the hazard function.
 is not statistically different from zero,
While the coefﬁcient on MGAP
 is statistically signiﬁcant at or below the .01
the coefﬁcient on VGAP
level, and the sign of the coefﬁcient is once again positive. This suggests
that partners with a greater difference in their predicted income vola27
Each model is reestimated—generally not shown except in col. 4 of table 3—using
the observed characteristic(s), E, rather than the generated one(s), Ê . The standard Hausman test is then constructed for the equality of the coefﬁcients on economic characteristics
g1, g2, or g3 across the two estimated speciﬁcations.
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TABLE 3
Estimation Results for the Divorce Hazard Rate (l) (Np1,207)
Regression
Explanatory Variable

CORR

(1)

(2)

(3)


MGAP

.347***
(.107)

⫺.023
(.024)

⫺.003
(.005)

MGAP
 7 100
VGAP

.109***
(.017)

VGAP 7 100

AGEW
EDM
EDW
WHITE
CATHOLIC
PARDIV
NOKIDS
Regressors
EXITS
Log likelihood
p-value (OCC [18])
p-value (AGE [12])
p-value (ED [12])
p-value (CROSS AGE
and ED [9])
p-value (Hausman [a])

.104
(.187)
.138
(.333)
⫺.173
(.173)
⫺.243
(.178)
⫺.021
(.123)
⫺.115
(.114)
.260*
(.140)
⫺.128
(.124)
36
353
⫺2,383.37
.139
.339
.080
.608
.019

(5)
.922**
(.470)

CORR

AGEM

(4)

1.306***
(.417)

⫺.017
(.156)
⫺.087
(.309)
⫺.185
(.177)
⫺.325**
(.158)
⫺.107
(.129)
⫺.066
(.125)
.276*
(.144)
⫺.253**
(.124)
36
353
⫺2,387.87
.002
.696
.178
.779
.441

⫺.028
⫺.229
(.205)
⫺.201
(.181)
⫺.253
(.146)
⫺.212**
(.090)
⫺.088
(.112)
.252*
(.135)
⫺.193**
(.096)
36
353
⫺2,383.87
.022
.607
.243
.587
.001

⫺.009
(.026)
.075***
(.022)

.037***
(.013)
⫺.014
(.157)
⫺.137
(.306)
⫺.223
(.173)
⫺.297**
(.147)
⫺.147
(.105)
⫺.087
(.110)
.244*
(.135)
⫺.220**
(.113)
38
353
⫺2,38.87
.005
.581
.031
.623
…

.085
(.204)
⫺.053
(.257)
⫺.153
(.182)
⫺.250
(.158)
⫺.068
(.128)
⫺.086
(.130)
.279*
(.153)
⫺.112
(.148)
38
353
⫺2,381.22
.013
.567
.217
.607
.002

Note.—See tables 1 and 2. Estimates are obtained from a proportional hazard model. Cols. 1–3 and 5 report the
estimation results for the full sample using the two-step estimation procedure in which the predicted joint economic
characteristics from table 2 are used. The standard errors for these cases are corrected for generated regressor bias
following Murphy and Topel (1985). The results in col. 4 pertain to the one-step estimator in which the realized joint
economic characteristics are used as explanatory variables. EXITS is the number of uncensored data observations,
namely those that end in divorce. p-value (Hausman) is taken from a Hausman speciﬁcation test of whether the joint
economic characteristics, CORR, MGAP, and VGAP are endogenous.
* Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .10 level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .05 level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .01 level.
a
The number of restrictions tested is 1 for cols. 1–3 and 3 for col. 5.
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TABLE 4
Additional Estimation Results for the Divorce Hazard Rate (l)
Regression
Variable

CORR

MGAP
 7 100
VGAP

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.687**
(.349)
⫺.009
(.015)
.114***
(.016)

.949**
(.475)
⫺.008
(.026)
.072***
(.022)

.829*
(.498)
⫺.021
(.025)
.091***
(.019)

1.521**
(.694)
⫺.008
(.033)
.076***
(.023)

1.055**
(.495)
⫺.004
(.045)
.069***
(.025)

.934*

⫺.052
(.164)
.088
(.207)
⫺.039
(.249)
⫺.164
⫺.152
(.198)
(.166)
⫺.311*
⫺.243
(.176)
(.179)
⫺.116
⫺.069
(.121)
(.127)
⫺.070
⫺.090
(.125)
(.128)
.305**
.276*
(.155)
(.148)
⫺.125
⫺.112
(.127)
(.140)
1,207
1,207
20
39
353
353
⫺2,396.72 ⫺2,381.17
…
.013
.570
.571
.156
.221

.068
(.210)
⫺.169
(.239)
⫺.144
(.185)
⫺.274*
(.149)
⫺.044
(.139)
⫺.079
(.121)
.299**
(.150)
⫺.099
(.135)
1,207
43
353
⫺2,372.57
.021
.583
.216

⫺.218
(.208)
⫺.071
(.265)
⫺.193
(.183)
⫺.515**
(.232)
.004
(.153)
.193
(.192)
⫺.239
(.174)
⫺.129
(.426)
966
38
291
⫺1,896.02
.072
.563
.065

.219
(.194)
.183
(.175)
⫺.044
(.218)
⫺.357*
(.184)
⫺.107
(.135)
⫺.101
(.134)
.241
(.165)
⫺.052
(.130)
966
38
296
⫺1,926.99
.003
.545
.039

SECOND
JOINT
AGEM
AGEW
EDM
EDW
WHITE
CATHOLIC
PARDIV
NOKIDS
Observations
Regressors
EXITS
Log likelihood
p-value (OCC [18])
p-value (AGE [12])
p-value (ED [12])
p-value (CROSS AGE and
ED [9])
p-value (Hausman [3])

.056
(.184)
⫺.297

.641
.001

.608
.006

.681
.001

.462
.048

.206
.001

.004
(.022)
.098***
(.019)
.257*
(.153)
⫺.009
(.159)
⫺.164
(.215)
⫺.198
(.173)
⫺.247*
(.149)
⫺.150**
(.089)
⫺.062
(.123)
.242*
(.139)
⫺.086
1,332
39
397
⫺2,723.94
.078
.637
.337
.525
.001

Note.—See table 3. The standard errors for these cases are corrected for generated regressor bias following Murphy
and Topel (1985). The estimation results all use the two-step estimation procedure in which the predicted joint economic
characteristics from table 2 are used. The results in col. 1 pertain to the case in which the individual marital occupation
dummy variables are excluded from the speciﬁcation. The results in col. 2 include both the individual marital occupations
and a dummy variable (JOINT) that takes the value one if both spouses have the same marital occupations. The results
in col. 3 include both the individual marital occupations and ﬁve dummy variables for the joint marital occupations
that were signiﬁcant at below the .1 level on the basis of a Lagrange multiplier test when they were individually included
in the speciﬁcation. The results in col. 4 pertain to the subsample in which the bottom quintile of actual income
correlations are removed from the sample. The results in col. 5 pertain to the subsample in which the top quintile of
mean income gaps (MGAPs) are removed from the sample. The results in col. 6 pertain to the expanded sample that
includes second marriages.
* Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .10 level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .05 level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant (two-tailed test) at the .01 level.
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tilities will have an increased chance of divorce, whereas those with a
greater mean difference will not. The estimates in columns 1–3 also
suggest that those respondents whose parents have divorced have a
higher chance of divorce themselves, whereas the results in columns 2
and 3 suggest that starting a marriage without children lowers the probability of divorce.
In column 5 of table 3, estimates are provided in which all three
economic variables are included simultaneously. Again, the coefﬁcients
 are positive and statistically different from zero
 and VGAP
on CORR
at or below the .05 level of statistical signiﬁcance. Moreover, the coef remains statistically indistinguishable from zero at
ﬁcient on MGAP
conventional levels. Interestingly, the results in table 2 provide evidence
that the predicted level of mean incomes has a much better ﬁtting
regression than the predicted income correlation as measured by its
R 2. It is likely, therefore, that the ﬁnding that g2 is insigniﬁcantly dif ’s poor measurement, but rather
ferent from zero is not due to MGAP
 ’s inability to contribute to the explanation of a marriage’s
to MGAP
duration.
To better aid the reader in understanding the role of the predicted
economic characteristics, column 4 presents estimates of the duration
model using the observed joint economic characteristics, E, rather than
predicted ones, Ê. Note that a similar pattern of coefﬁcients and statistical signiﬁcance is found whether the observed or predicted characteristics are used. However, the estimated coefﬁcients in column 5 using
the predicted characteristics are much larger in magnitude, as are their
estimated standard errors. With the exception of the results in column
2—where the estimated coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcantly different from
zero—the p-value for the Hausman test rejects the equality of the coefﬁcients. This ﬁnding places additional importance on having created
the key economic characteristics from data known at the beginning of
the marriage.
Table 4 provides additional empirical results that demonstrate the
robustness of the ﬁndings. In particular, the results in columns 1–3
investigate the extent to which the ﬁndings are affected by including
Z i only in the economic characteristics prediction equation (22) but
not in the duration equation (21), while allowing individual marital
occupations in both equations. Column 1 presents results from the
baseline speciﬁcation, where I excludes the 18 individual marital oc ,
cupation variables from the duration equation. The results for CORR


MGAP, and VGAP are little changed. A second modiﬁcation, presented
in column 2, explores whether partners with the same marital occupation marry because of some common interest or “love,” which may
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independently affect the duration of marriage.28 To this end, I reestimate
the marriage duration equation and include an additional dummy variable for whether spouses have the identical marital occupation
(JOINTp1). The results indicate, however, that JOINT is not statistically
signiﬁcant, and the overall results are unchanged.
Another modiﬁcation, presented in column 3, is to see whether including a number of cross-spouse marital occupations into the marital
duration speciﬁcation affects the key results. This was undertaken in
the following steps. First, I conducted individual Lagrange multiplier
tests—not shown—to see which of the possible 78 observed combinations of cross-spouse occupation dummies might potentially be omitted
from the baseline speciﬁcation (21) on the basis of a .1 signiﬁcance
threshold. I found that ﬁve such variables passed this criterion. I then
reestimated the baseline speciﬁcation by including these ﬁve potentially
omitted joint marital occupation variables in the duration model.29 The
results, presented in column 3, indicate that such a modiﬁcation does
not change the estimated pattern of the response of the duration of
marriage to the predicted joint economic characteristics, Ê. The ﬁndings
in columns 1–3, therefore, suggest some robustness from using joint
cross-marital occupation codes to identify the impact of joint economic
characteristics on marital duration.
The results in columns 4 and 5 of table 4 are presented to ensure
further that our baseline sample and speciﬁcation are not unduly inﬂuenced by households that may display reverse causality with respect
to economic characteristics and marital success.30 For example, suppose
that households have some private information that one of the partners
will be very successful in market activity and that one partner specializes
in home production. We would expect that couples like this would
display a larger gap in mean observed incomes and more negatively
correlated observed incomes. The results in columns 4 and 5 remove
marriages whose partners have the bottom quintile of observed mean
income correlations, CORR i, and the top quintile of observed mean
income differences, MGAPi, respectively, in the sample.31 The results for
28
Though not reported, spouses with identical marital occupations have signiﬁcantly
higher actual as well as predicted income correlations, though reduced mean and variance
differences.
29
Of course, with a size of 10 percent for false rejections, ﬁve out of 78 rejections of
the null are quite unremarkable. These marital combinations are (male–female): 1–7, 2–
6, 5–2, 6–4, and 6–8. See n. 21 for the occupational numberings.
30
Of course, this is exactly the reason why the predicted values of CORR, MGAP, and
VGAP, rather than their actual values, are included in the speciﬁcation of the hazard rate,
eq. (21).
31
The ﬁndings are also unchanged if I remove the top quintile of actual income variance
differentials, VGAP, in the samples or impose a minimum average earnings restriction for
each partner.
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g1, g2, and g3, reported in columns 4 and 5, however, are unaffected by
the removal of these households.
As a ﬁnal investigation, I included second marriages in the data set,
reestimated the projection equations (not shown) and proportional hazard model equation, and included a dummy variable for second marriages (SECOND) in both equations.32 One would think, however, that
second marriages for the respondent might involve some learning,
which would lead them to make better matches during second marriages. The results, reported in column 6 of table 4, indicate, however,
that the inclusion of these additional marriages leaves the baseline estimation results unchanged.
IV.

Conclusion

This paper presents strong evidence that joint economic characteristics
from the beginning of a marriage are signiﬁcant explanatory factors in
a marriage’s probability of survival. The evidence uncovered is that more
positively correlated incomes between partners and a bigger gap in their
income volatilities are associated with marriages of decreased duration,
though bigger mean income gaps do not affect a marriage’s duration.
This pattern of results is consistent with the view that spouses who are
good economic matches for one another are associated with longerlasting marriages and that initial love is not a reliable substitute for this
essential ingredient.
A potential shortcoming of this model is that love is purely determined
by exogenous factors.33 Rather, if partners could invest in love to raise
its future stock, then they may ﬁnd that better economic matches would
lead to a higher return on the investment in love. In turn, as a result,
partners with better economic characteristics would accumulate a
greater stock of love, which would make these marriages last longer.
However, such considerations do not alter the basic ﬁnding that beneﬁcial economic characteristics lead to an increase in the survival of
marriages and that initial love cannot simply be substituted in its place.
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